activities, in which appears no merely epiphenomenal consciousness as a mysterious and otiose by-product, but rather a guiding foresight of desired goals, an intelligent choice of means or ways of approach to those goals, and an effective striving towards them guided by appreciation of relations relevant to attainment of the goals. All this makes possible controlling interventions in the course of physical nature for the service of human needs, interventions which have been the material basis of every civilization, from the simplest tools to the internal-combustion engine, the Grand Coulee Dam, the modern calculating machine, and systems of parliamentary democracy; or, if the generations to come should ever achieve this supreme goal, an effective system of international law controlling all human groups on a democratic basis. To my mind it is not credible that these psychic teleological modes of activity can have been products of increasing complexity of conjunctions of strictly mechanical atoms. This incredibility is implicitly acknowledged by the mechanists in their refusal to recognize the reality of teleological activity of any kind.

The doctrine of emergent evolution here summarily stated is modified by some emergentists in two very important respects. First, it is assumed that the matter from which living things are alleged to have emerged was not such as physics and chemistry have commonly assumed it to be; but rather a matter having, as in

Lillie's scheme, something of the nature of living things, perhaps something of a psychical nature, as Leibnitz and Whitehead and the ancient hylozoists have maintained. Or, like S. Alexander and L. T. Hobhouse, the emergentists postulate in primordial matter, the physical basis from which our world